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Abstract: This paper investigates the current monetary policy regime of China’s 
Central Bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC). This is done from the specific 
viewpoint of PBoC financial strength and the cost of its monetary policy instruments. 
The  result  shows  that  PBoC  is  constrained  by  the  costs  of  its  monetary  policy 
instruments. PBoC tend to use less costly but market-distorting instruments such as 
deposit  interest  rate  cap  and  reserve-ratio  requirements,  rather  than  more 
market-oriented  but  more  costly  instruments  such  as  central  bank  note  issuance. 
These  costs  remain  under  control  today,  but  may  rise  in  the  future  as  PBoC 
accumulates more foreign assets. This, in turn, will jeopardize the Chinese monetary 
authority’s capability to maintain price stability. 
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1  Introduction 
It was first formally stated by Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming, as a corollary of 
their Keynesian model of an open economy, that an economy cannot simultaneously 
maintain a fixed exchange rate, free capital movement, and an independent monetary 
policy (Mundell, 1960; Fleming, 1962), known as the “Incompatible Trinity” (Rose, 
2000). It's been more than four decades since their works were published, yet the 
predictive power of their pure-theoretical assertion is still becoming more and more 
widely  recognized  as  one  pillar  of  the  Trinity  -  free  capital  movement  -  is 
strengthened by the more and more integrated global financial market. Central banks 
of countries with a liberalized capital account usually found it extremely hard to 
maintain a fixed or less fluctuating exchange rate while keeping track of domestic 
money  supply  at  the  same  time.  Their  central  banks  tried  to  use  open  market 
operations to offset impacts of foreign capital inflows and outflows on domestic 
credit, but these attempts are often costly and unsustainable in the long run. Such 
attempts could even eventually lead to financial turmoils: interventions on exchange 
rate are widely considered as one of the causes of financial crises of Latin American 
countries during 1980s and that of East Asian countries during late 1990s. In the end 
there aren't much choices left for the central banks, but either to let the exchange rate 
to  free  float  and  bear  the  fluctuations,  or  to  give  up  monetary  sovereignty  by 
adopting  are  currency-board-alike  regime,  join  a  currency  union,  or  even  go 
dollarization. 
China  appears  to  be  an  outlier  who  hasn't  suffered  much  from  the  pain  of 
financial globalization. The US Dollar / Chinese Yuan exchange rate remained fixed 
for over a decade since 1994. In 2005 People's Bank of China, the Chinese central 
bank,  announced  to  abandon  fixed  exchange  rate  to  adopt  a  managed  float  peg 
against a basket of currencies, but the fluctuation of USD/CNY exchange rate since 
then is still minor by international standards. During the same period, PBoC actively 
employed monetary policy instruments to manage domestic credit supply and retain 
a stable price level. Figure 1 presents China's broad money supply and consumer   3 
price  index  since  1994.  It  can  be  seen  that  PBoC  had  successfully  ended  the 
hyperinflation caused by Chinese government abandoning economic planning during 
1994-1995 and had sustained a relatively stable inflation level afterward, despite a 

































Why, then, is China capable of carrying out effective monetary policy while keeping 
the exchange rate fixed at the same time? As will be shown in the following parts of 
this paper, such ability to a large extent owes to the relatively low cost of PBoC's 
sterilization operations. Based on estimations from the public-reported balance sheet 
of PBoC, we show that PBoC retained positive gains for every single year since 
2000
1, despite explosive international reserve accumulation during the same period. 
However, the sterilization capability was by no means achieved without cost. 
We will further argue that the low cost of sterilization was due to the domestic 
financial repression environment. Interest rate on CNY nominated assets was kept 
lower than the return on capital the market otherwise would demand. PBoC had to 
employ  other  market -distorting  policy  instruments,  such  as  raising  deposit 
                                                        
1  First year the data became publically available. 
Figure  1:  China  M2  Growth  and  CPI, 
1994-2008   4 
requirements or even directly setting lending quotas on banks, so that it could reduce 
the  volume  of  excess  liquidity  that  needed  to  be  sterilized  by  central  bank  note 
issuance, and thus lower the total cost of sterilization. These measures hindered the 
financial  market  from  working  efficiently.  Nevertheless,  the  pressure  for  PBoC 
becomes more and more intense as current account imbalance persists and foreign 
capital inflow continues. Losses of international reserve due to appreciation on CNY 
also become another concern. These issues stated above, if not properly resolved, 
will undermine China's financial stability in the long run. 
The reminder of the paper  is organized as  follows. Section 2 introduces  the 
Chinese monetary authority: how it comes thus far, what is the current situation, and 
how it operates in this environment. In Section 3 we estimate the profitability of 
PBoC's operations from its assets and liabilities, and then estimate the different costs 
PBoC incurred when applying different policy instruments. We employ a model of 
central  bank financial strength  to  illustrate PBoC's  current  situation and possible 
consequences in Section 4. Conclusions and some oversights are given in the last 
section. 
 
2    Central banking in China 
2.1    Starting from PBoC's balance sheet 
A Central bank is the monetary authority of a country. Usually a central bank acts as 
the primary provider of money and credit, the monitor and stabilizer of price and 
economic growth, and the lender of last resort in harsh situations, although the actual 
functions  of  them  may  differ  from  country  to  country.  All  these  functions  are 
reflected in the asset and liability holdings on its balance sheet. The balance sheet of 
a typical central bank is presented in Table 1. On the assets side, the central bank 
holds real asset (gold reserve), international reserves, and domestic assets. Domestic 
assets  are  either  loans  to  financial  corporations,  or  all  kinds  of  debts  (mostly   5 
government bonds). On the liabilities side, central bank issues currency and owes 
deposit reserves from domestic financial institutions. Some central banks also issue 
their own debts other than currency.   
 
The balance sheet of People's Bank of China follows the same structure, although it 
looks to be somewhat less `typical' in detail. Table 2 presents a simplified version of 
PBoC's balance sheet as of December 2008 (compared to 1999): 
 
We can see that the composition of PBoC's assets and liabilities changed quite a lot 
in the 10 year period. The worth-noting characteristics of PBoC's balance sheet in 
2008 are as follows: 
-  Huge amount of foreign assets. Foreign assets accounted for approximately 
four fifths of PBoC's all assets in book value. The ratio of foreign assets 
over currency issue is about 4.4:1. 
-  Little government debts and even less other market debts. 
-  Large deposit reserve. On Dec 2008 PBoC was holding RMB 9.2 trillion of 
deposit reserve from depository institutions, approaching half of its total   6 
liabilities. The large amount of deposit reserve is primarily because PBoC 
raised  deposit  reserve  requirement  ratio  intensively  since  2006  to  slow 
down the growth of money supply.   
-  Bond issuance. The volume of PBoC-issued note outstanding was RMB 4.6 
trillion  by  the  end  of  2008,  exceeded  the  volume  of  currency  issue, 
compared to none in 1999. PBoC pays market interest rate on these central 
bank notes. They are traded on the inter-bank bond market, and are usually 
held by financial institutions such as commercial banks and money funds. 
Why, then, is there such a huge difference between now and ten years ago? The 
driving force was the mass trade surplus and capital inflows during the period. In 
response, PBoC had taken all kinds of measures to sterilize the foreign capital and 
maintain a stable money supply growth. 
 
2.2    Explosive international reserve accumulation 
Without  any  doubt,  China  now  holds  the  largest  international  reserve  among  all 
countries.  The  State  Administration  of  Foreign  Exchange  (SAFE)  reported  its 
international reserves a total value of USD 1.95 trillion by 2008, about one fourth of 
world's total international reserves reported by IMF. Figure  2 compares China to 
other top international reserves holders. 
China hasn't been the largest international reserves holding country for long. It 
was only in late 2005 that China's total international reserves exceeded Japan. Dated 
back to 1980s and early 1990s, foreign currencies were so scarce to the economy that 
the government had to allocate foreign exchange to importing firms by quotas
2. It is 
only since China adopted a fixed exchange rate regime in 1994 that international 
                                                        
2  China adopted a so-called “dual-track” foreign exchange rate regime before 1994. There were two different 
exchange  rates,  an  official  rate  and  a  market  rate.  The  government  allocated  foreign  exchange  quotas  to 
state-owned enterprises which gave them the right to import foreign products at the price of official rate. All 
other imports went to the market track, in which firms had to pay the market rate for foreign exchange, which 
was determined by a foreign exchange market and is significantly higher than the official rate.   7 
reserves  began  to  rise  sharply.  In  particular,  the  speed  of  international  reserves 
accumulation has accelerated since China joined WTO in 2001. 
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Although  China's  international  reserve  is  huge  in  absolute  term,  it's  not  that 
extraordinary  if  compared  to  the  size  of  Chinese  economy.  Total  value  of 
international  reserves  in  2008  is  about  44  percent  of  China  annual  GDP,  or  76 
percent of trade volume (import plus export), quite large but not outstanding by East 
Asian countries standards
3. It is the magnitude of its growth rate that is astonishing. 
Annual growth rate averaged 34 percent for the last eight years, far exceeded the 16 
percent average nominal GDP growth rate for the same period. 
Why would China have hoarded so m uch international reserves? We have 
several candidate explanations. First, it is widely believed that East Asian countries 
                                                        
3  See Hawkins (2004) for a cross-country comparison.   8 
increased their international reserves after the Asian financial crisis to pursuit more 
stability  in  their  currency  and  to  prevent  future  financial  crises.  Holding  more 
international reserves “can be viewed as a precautionary adjustment, reflecting the 
desire for self-insurance against exposure to future sudden stops” (Aizenman and 
Marion, 2003;Aizenman and Lee, 2007). This explanation works for most East Asian 
countries but China seems to be different: China was one of the East Asian countries 
that  suffered  the  least  contraction  during  the  crisis,  yet  it  increased  international 
reserves the most after the crisis. An alternative explanation puts it in the context of 
global imbalance.   
Second,  in  their  view,  mass  international  reserves  is  a  by-product  of  the 
so-called “Bretton Woods II” system (Dooley et al., 2003): “periphery countries” 
takes export-led growth strategy to maintain fast growth so that they can catch up 
with US, the “center country”. Neither does this modern mercantilist theory seem to 
fully explain China since foreign capital inflows far exceeded the amount of money 
supply China needed.   
A  third  point  of  view  associates  accumulation  of  international  reserves  with 
unbalances within the Chinese economy, that Chinese people tend to consume less 
and save more, naturally lead to trade surplus and growing international reserves. 
None of the views above seems to be outstandingly convincing. Perhaps each 
explanation reveals part of the truth, but it's not the purpose of this paper to find out. 
Rather, we are more interested in how the Chinese central bank deals with increasing 
international reserves, given that it has limited power to influence the amount of 
capital inflows. 
2.3    Money supply and policy instruments 
Sterilizing  foreign  capital  inflows  is  a  common  issue  for  countries  with  large 
international reserves. This can be viewed from central bank's balance sheet. An 
increase in international reserves is an increase in assets of the central bank and will   9 
correspond to an increase in liabilities for the same amount, therefore high-power 
money supply will increase, unless sterilizing operations are  undertaken, i.e., the 
central  bank  sells  its  other  assets  or  rises  certain  kind  of  its  liability  other  than 
currency to absorb the impact. 
The two major instruments intensively used by PBoC to sterilize capital inflows 
are open market operations and deposit reserve requirement. 
-  Open market operations: Since 2002 PBoC issues and trades short-term and 
mid-term notes to absorb capital inflows into the economy. Interest rates on 
these notes largely depend on the short-term market interest rate. Maturity is 
usually less than a year, but when the need for sterilization is urgent PBoC 
will issue 3-year mid-term notes. 
-  Deposit reserve requirement: Starting in 2006, PBoC began to use deposit 
reserve requirement ratio (RRR) as a policy instrument. It raises RRR in 
small steps (usually by 0.5 percent each time) to slow down broad money 
expansion. Reserve requirement ratio was initially 6 percent in 2006 and 
peaked 17.5 percent in July 2008. In the following months PBoC began to 
lower the rate due to the economic downturn. By December the reserve 
requirement ratio was 16 percent, still well above international standards. 
Figure 3 shows how these two policies are used to absorb capital inflows. Volume of 
PBoC-issued notes keeps increasing since 2002 but the speed did not catch up with 
that of international reserves after 2007. Instead, deposit reserves rose dramatically 
for the recent two years to match the accelerating capital inflows. As a result of these 
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Besides sterilization operations, PBoC also needs to deal with internal credit markets 
in order to adjust broad money supply and to fight inflation. This is achieved by 
adjusting interest rates and sometimes setting loan caps to commercial banks.   
-  Interest rate: PBoC maintains strong control over interest rates in China. It 
sets  price  caps  on  deposit  interest  rates,  and  price  floors  on  loan  rates. 
Commercial banks in China always set their deposit rates at the price cap to 
compete for depositors. The situation of loan rates is more complicated. 
Usually large enterprises can acquire loans at the floor interest rate, but it 
may not be the case for small business or individual borrowers. 
-  Loan volume caps: when the threat of inflation became harsh, PBoC might 
directly intervene on commercial bank's loan making. For instance, it was 
widely reported in 2008 that PBoC set caps for each individual bank on how 
much new loans they could make for that year. PBoC does not publicly 
announce these numbers, nor do we have sufficient evidence to indicate that 
PBoC implemented this policy every year (or at least the restriction is not   11 
binding for every year).   
Most of these policy instruments implemented by PBoC creates distortions that may 
lower efficiency of the financial market. High deposit reserve requirement ratio hurts 
the profitability of commercial banks by freezing a portion of their assets. Frequent 
adjustment  to  deposit  reserve  requirement  ratio  may  lead  to  extra  costs  as 
commercial  banks  may  have  to  keep  extra  cash  in  hand  to  respond  to  ratio 
adjustments.  Deposit  and loan interest  rate  controls  prevents  the market  price to 
adjust according to supply and demands. The only exception is notes issuing and 
trading. The question is: why would PBoC prefer to use all these market-distorting 
instruments, rather than sticking to open market operations? 
Historically,  PBoC  kept  deposit  and  loan  rates  low  so  that  state-owned 
enterprises  are  subsidized  buy  receiving  loans  from  banks,  which  are  also 
state-owned(Gordon and Li, 2003). But now the number of state-owned enterprises 
has significantly reduced, and most banks have become publicly listed companies 
that  seek  to  maximize  its  stock  value  rather  than  providing  cheap  credit  to 
state-owned enterprises. What's the motivation now for PBoC to maintain all these 
interventions? We will show in the next section that one possible reason may be that 
PBoC have to do so to keep the cost of its monetary operations low. 
 
3    Financial  strength  of  PBoC  and  the  cost  of  monetary  policy 
instruments 
We estimate the cost of PBoC monetary policy instruments by two steps. The first 
step is to find out PBoC's periodical gains/losses from its all operations. However, 
PBoC do not report its income statement to the public. Alternatively, we back out the 
monthly profit of PBoC from its balance sheet, which is updated every month by 
PBoC in its statistics release. In the second step we estimate the costs of the three 
major instruments - deposit reserve requirement ratio, central bank note issue and   12 
deposit interest rate - through linear regressions. 
Before going into the estimation method and results, it's important first to clarify 
the reasons for using such a two-step estimation procedure. A simple yet widely 
accepted method to obtain sterilization cost is simply to estimate the interest rate 
premium of domestic assets over foreign assets (see, Kletzer and Spiegel (2004), for 
example). However, whether this method is applicable to China remains in question, 
because yield on domestic assets in China largely depends on the deposit interest rate 
which is also set by PBoC. The two-step method allows us to endogenize deposit 
interest rate as a policy variable and estimate the cost associated with it. Moreover, 
the profit itself provides extra information: we are interested in whether PBoC is 
able to cover the sterilization costs by its own seignorage income. The closer PBoC 
approaches  zero  or  negative  profit,  the  less  power  it  has  on  further  sterilization 
operations. 
 
3.1 Estimating profit of PBoC 
The  estimation  of  PBoC's  profit  is  based  on  its  balance  sheet.  PBoC  began  to 
publicly report its balance sheet monthly in December 1999. International reserve 
became  a  concern  only  after  China  joined  WTO  in  2001,  so  the  available  data 
perfectly covers this period. 
On  its  balance  sheet,  PBoC  presented  its  assets  and  liabilities  in  categories. 
Profit is obtained by summing up the estimated gains/losses on each category of 
assets then subtracting holding costs of each category of liabilities. Details of the 
estimation procedure are presented in Appendix. Several treatments in estimating the 
gains/losses are non-trivial thus are worth mentioning here: 
-  No public information is available about the composition of international 
reserves. Instead, we use quarterly international reserves composition of all 
countries from IMF Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange   13 
Reserves  (COFER)  database  as  an  approximation.  We  only  take  into 
account  assets  nominated  in  US  dollars,  Euros  and  Japanese  Yens.  This 
approximation  is  consistent  with  other  direct  estimations  of  China's 
international reserve compositions by Zhao (2005) and Liu (2008). Yield on 
these assets is approximated by ten-year government bonds issued by the 
corresponding national government (for Euro asset, it's an average of bond 
of several national governments in Euro area).   
-  PBoC does not book the gains/losses of international reserves caused by 
exchange rates fluctuations, so we use international reserve data published 
by SAFE to calculate yields. Since PBoC takes such an accounting method 
on balance sheets, it is not likely to book exchange rate gains/losses on their 
income  statement  either.  For  this  reason  we  consider  exchange  rate 
gains/losses separately from interest gains/losses. Two estimations are given, 
one takes exchange rate gains/losses into account while the other don't. 
-  Administrative and operational costs of PBoC is not available and thus is 
not subtracted from estimated profit. these costs are usually quite stable and 
unlikely to vary with monetary policy changes. Since our purpose is to see 
how PBoC's monetary policy will affect its profit, ignoring these costs will 
only bring minimal distortion to our results. 
Figure 4 shows the result of our estimation, one line is PBoC monthly profit without 
exchange rate effect and the other is with it. Both series have been normalized by 
currency issue. If we do not take into account exchange rate gains/losses, PBoC have 
achieved  positive  profit  in  every  month  of  the  eight  years.  On  average  PBoC 
obtained about 0.55 percent of monthly profit over currency issue, or 6.6 percent per 
year. Profitability varies from time to time: in the most profitable year 2006 it was 11 
percent of currency issue, while in 2008 the number falls down to 4 percent. 
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Including  exchange  rate  gains/losses  completely  alter  the  pattern.  Before  2005 
Chinese Yuan hard-pegged US Dollars at an exchange rate of 8.28. In August 2005 
PBoC announced an instant 3 percent appreciation against US Dollars and adopted a 
crawling peg regime since then. Profit presents greater fluctuations when exchange 
rate gains/losses are included. The trend component of it, obtained through an HP 
filter, is continuously declining since 2003. The trend reveals that on average PBoC 
has been running with negative profit since 2007. 
   15 
3.2    Estimating the cost of PBoC's monetary policy 
3.2.1    Equation and Variables 
We estimate the following equation:   
1 2 3 1 · t t t t t t t t Profit depr rrr note depr note            X ò  
On the left hand side is PBC's monthly net profit over currency issue. On the left 
hand side are PBC's three major monetary policy instruments: deprt , benchmark 
one-year  deposit  rate;  rrrt ,  reserve  requirement  ratio;  and  notet ,  the  volume  of 
outstanding PBC issued notes divided by reserve money. We are also interested in 
the cross term of deposit rate and note outstanding volume. Controlling variables Xt 
are listed in Table 3. The regression is run on monthly data from January 2000 to 
December 2008. 
   16 
 
 
3.2.2 Regression Estimation 
We  ran  OLS  regressions  over  the  whole  sample  period  with  different  dependent 
variables:  the  first  includes  exchange  rate  effects  and  the  second  doesn't.  Each 
dependent and independent variables is first-order differentiated to assure that it does 
not  have  a  unit  root  when  it  enters  the  regression  equation.  The  White 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent  Estimator  is  used  to  obtain  robust  significance 
intervals. Estimation results are presented in Table 5. 
   17   18 
The discussion concerning the cost of PBoC's monetary policy is based on the above 
regression results. Benchmark 1-year deposit interest rate: deposit rate itself is not 
significant in the second equation, but its cross term with note issue is significant. 
This means raising deposit rate do brings cost to PBoC since it then have to pay 
higher  interest  rate  on  its  central  bank  notes.  In  the  first  equation,  however,  the 
coefficient is negative and strongly significant. CNY will appreciate against other 
currencies as return on CNY assets increase. Our result shows that other variables 
being controlled; raising deposit interest rate by 1 percent will cause PBoC profit 
over currency to drop by as much as 5 percent.   
Reserve requirement ratio rrr is not statistically significant in either of the two 
regressions. We can interpret that the cost to PBoC of raising reserve requirement 
ratio seems to be minimal. Although PBoC do pay interest to commercial banks on 
deposit reserves, this cost is not significant compared to other policy instruments. 
But  commercial  banks  might  have  lost  their  operating  efficiency  as  reserve 
requirement rises. In other words, PBoC might have shifted the cost of sterilization 
to commercial banks by raising reserve requirement. 
It might be suspicious to see a positive coefficient on Central bank notes issue, 
note, at the first glance, but one shall align the coefficients of both note itself and its 
interaction term with deposit interest rate to get the whole picture. Estimation result 
shows that deposit rate of about 1 percent is the break-even point. When deposit rate 
is below 1 percent, issuing notes even brings profit to PBoC, but when deposit rate is 
above 1 percent, interest payments become a burden to PBoC. Note that 1 percent 
here might not be a precise estimate; nonetheless, the effect that cost of note issue 
rises when deposit rate is high do seem to be robust. 
Implications of these results will be further developed in the next section. 
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4    Is China's current central banking regime sustainable? 
The past one two decades saw deepening understandings over the “art and science” 
of central banking in the economics literature (Feldstein, 2006). Central bankers and 
monetary economists reached wide consensus over several key issues in conducting 
monetary policy: long-term goal of price stability, independent monetary authority, 
and credibility of policy commitments, to name a few. 
However, the financial strength of a central bank - how much capital it owns, the 
allocation and quality of its assets, and especially how much profit it makes - is 
seldom mentioned in the literature. Most works in this field simply do not take into 
account central bank's financial strength. They do have reasons doing so. The usual 
arguments are as follows: 
-  The main function of a central bank is to ensure moderate money and credit 
environment  for  the  economy.  Profitability  should  be  off  the  priority 
concern of central bankers. 
-  With its monopolistic power in money creation, central banks are usually 
making profits sufficiently large enough to cover their expenses. 
-  Should  a  central  bank  incur  negative  profit  during  extreme  economic 
conditions, these losses shall nonetheless be covered by the government. 
In short, financial strength of central banks did not seem to be a problem historically, 
and  central  banks  should  not  care  about  their  profitability  when  making  policy 
decisions. 
But the healthiness of central bank balance sheet does seem to be an issue in real 
world central banking, especially for emerging countries. Central banks of a group of 
Latin American countries were continuously losing money in 1987-2001 which in 
turn undermined their monetary and exchange rate policy (Stella, 2002). Unhealthy 
balance sheet of the central bank is considered to be one of the major cause why 
some  countries  have  suffered  more  from  the  Asian  Financial  Crisis.  Even   20 
well-industrialized countries are not exempt from financial strength problems. For 
example, Bank of Japan has continued to express concern about potential capital 
losses from its large holdings of Japanese government bonds (Cargill, 2005). 
Ize (2005) and Stella (2005) provided alternative perspectives on central bank 
financial strength. They both argued that, although a central bank never needs to 
default on its liabilities, it would have to print more fiat money to meet the need to 
pay back them should it not be able to  generate sufficient  gains from  its assets. 
Therefore, a central bank cannot credibly attain a nominal policy objective without 
the support of its financial strength. A keep-losing-money central bank will be forced 
to deviate from providing planned money supply thus unable to keep a stable price 
level. Another choice is to turn to the government for fiscal assistance, but it largely 
depends on the government's fiscal strength and willingness to help out. Also, central 
bank losses some extent of its independence by doing so. 
Excluding currency revaluation effect, so far PBoC is not losing money. At the 
same time PBoC have managed to control inflation, with only limited help from the 
government.  According  to  Chinese  law,  should  PBoC  run  under  deficit,  central 
government should undertake such losses by fiscal net transfer. Since PBoC is not 
losing money according to our estimation, it is not likely that such transfers had 
occurred in the past. In fact it is more likely the case that PBoC is transferring its 
profit to its owner, the central government
4. It seems PBoC has gone a third way  - 
with the help of a repressed domestic financial market. 
PBoC's control on interest rates, especially the cap set on deposit interest rate, is 
the first component of PBoC's strategy against rising sterilization cost. Compared to 
China's 8 to 10 percent annual real GDP growth rate, average one -year nominal 
deposit interest rate was 2.5 percent during 2000-2008. Even in early 2008 when CPI 
growth rate peaked above 6 percent, deposit rate remained just above 4 percent. 
                                                        
4  It should be noted that the Chinese government have provided help recently. In 2007 It replaced 200 billion of 
international reserves by government bonds and used these reserves to set up the the China Investment Corp. 
After the transaction PBoC receives stable and relatively high yield from government bonds while government 
takes the risk of foreign investment.   21 
Historically PBoC used to take interest rate as its priority policy instrument against 
inflation. For example, in year 1994 PBoC pushed up one-year deposit rate to above 
10 percent to pull back inflation. At that time China was more of a closed economy 
with international reserves no more than 52 billion US Dollars. Now with 50 times 
more international reserves, PBoC have to hold deposit rate low so that it can pay 
low interest rate on central bank notes as well as deposit reserves. Sterilization thus 
becomes much less costly. 
The  second  component  is  deposit  reserve  requirement  ratio.  Reserve 
requirement for commercial banks have almost fallen into the financial history in 
contemporary well developed financial markets after several decades of financial 
innovations. But in China, two important factors has made requirement ratio still a 
powerful tool. First, traditional deposit-loan business still constitutes a major portion 
of financing activities in China. Other financing channels, especially corporate bond 
markets,  remains  underdeveloped.  Second,  under  depressed  deposit  rate,  profit 
margin widens for commercial banks, and so PBoC can raise reserve requirement 
ratio to more than 15 percent while commercial bank business is still profitable. 
There's  a  hidden  assumption  lying  in  all  the  discussions  above:  that  PBoC 
cannot freely adjust the exchange rate. Surely, if PBoC could allow exchange rate to 
accommodate freely to the foreign exchange market, it wouldn't have accumulated 
so much international reserves and sterilization would never have been a problem at 
all. Interestingly, China do have a quite flexible foreign exchange market before 
1994. That the decision making process of the authority remains unclear but China 
shifted to a fixed exchange rate in 1994. Exchange rate flexibility remained low 
since then. 
After  all,  real  exchange  rate  of  China  against  other  country  will  have  to 
appreciate according to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. However, the more foreign 
asset has accumulated in the form of international reserves, the more reluctant the 
authority will be to let exchange rate to free flow as more losses will come with 
appreciation of home currency. Holding nominal exchange rate constant, the real   22 
exchange rate appreciation will thus result in inflationary pressure, but this pressure 
has  been  successfully  held  back  by  PBoC's  monetary  policy  through  depressed 
interest rate and high reserve requirements. It remains in question how long PBoC 
can  continue  to  provide  stable  money  supply  in  this  way.  But,  if  the  growth  of 
international reserves continue to exceed growth of currency supply (which increases 
the need for sterilization, and if the Chinese financial markets continue to innovate) 
which constraints PBoC's ability to control sterilization cost, it's only a matter of 
time before this becomes an implausible task 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have investigated the current monetary policy regime of the Chinese 
central  bank,  People's  Bank  of  China,  from  the  specific  viewpoint  of  PBoC's 
financial strength and the cost of its monetary policy instruments.   
How to maintain price stability under the circumstance of large foreign capital 
inflows from growing current account surpluses have become the main issue for 
China's monetary policy in the most recent decade. According to our findings, on the 
whole  PBoC  has  successfully  minimized  the  shock  of  foreign  capital  to  money 
supply. However, this was achieved by holding interest rate at a relatively low level, 
sharply rising reserve requirement ratio, and sometimes even by direct intervention 
on the volume of loans made by commercial banks. Only as such was PBoC able to 
maintain  the  cost  of  its  sterilization  operations  at  a  low  level.  In  other  words, 
capability of Chinese authority carrying out current monetary policy is based on the 
repressed domestic financial markets. 
Identifying the most appropriate monetary policy in an increasingly integrated 
global economy is not an easy task for a developing-country central bank. It is not 
the purpose of this paper to answer whether China has adopted proper monetary 
policy  for  the  last  few  years.  To  make  such  judgment  one  need  to  thoroughly   23 
understand each of the potential policy options and its outcomes, for that purposes 
our findings is far from sufficient.   
But, more importantly, from our results one can see more clearly the connection 
between China's monetary policy and its financial market structure, and the trade-off 
between sterilization cost and financial market efficiency faced by Chinese monetary 
authority. As long as China's trade surplus and foreign capital inflows persist, it is 
likely that this trade-off will continue to play an important role in China's future 
monetary policy.   24 
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Appendix: Estimation of People’s Bank of China’s Profit 
Estimates of PBoC profit is based on its balance sheet. 
ASSETS max min mean LIABILITIES max min mean
Foreign Assets 78.5% 36.9% 56.2% Reserve money 93.7% 53.5% 73.2%
Foreign Exchange 72.2% 35.4% 53.9% Currency issue 50.3% 16.7% 30.2%
Monetary Gold 0.7% 0.0% 0.3% Deposit of financial institutions 47.1% 29.3% 37.0%
Other Foreign Assets 7.7% 0.4% 2.0% Deposit money banks 46.9% 29.0% 36.5%
Claims on Government 9.6% 1.9% 4.9% Special depositor institutions 0.7% 0.2% 0.4%
Of which: Central Government 9.6% 0.0% 3.7% Other financial institutions 0.4% 0.0% 0.1%
Claims on Depository Money Banks 42.8% 3.8% 15.5% Deposits of non-financial institutions 15.6% 0.1% 6.0%
Claims on specific depository institutions 5.8% 0.9% 3.1% Demand deposits 0.2% 0.1% 0.2%
Claims on other financial institutions 23.1% 5.7% 14.1% Saving deposits 15.4% 0.0% 9.6%
Claims on non-financial institutions 0.5% 0.0% 0.2% Bond issue 27.8% 0.0% 14.4%
Other assets 15.1% -0.1% 7.8% Foreign liabilities 1.1% 0.4% 0.7%
Deposits of government   14.8% 5.0% 10.2%
Of which: Central government 7.7% 1.9% 4.9%
Own capital 1.1% 0.1% 0.4%
Other liabilities 11.1% 0.3% 5.0%
TOTAL ASSETS 100% 100% 100% TOTAL LIABILITIES 100% 100% 100%
Proportional Balance sheet from Dec. 1999 to Dec.2008
 
On  the  asset  side,  we  estimated  the  return  of  6  items,  which  includes  “foreign 
exchange”, “other foreign assets”, “claims on government”, “claims on depository 
money banks”, “claim on other financial institutions”, and leaving out “monetary 
gold”, “claim on non-financial institutions”, “other assets”. We leave out the latter 3 
items because all of their return rates are difficult to obtain, plus “monetary gold” 
and “claim on non-financial institutions” only takes a very small portion (0.5%) of 
total assets. On average, 91.8% of total asset is included in the 6 items.   
On  the  liability  side,  we  included  4  items  into  our  estimation,  which  are 
“currency issue”, “deposit of financial institutions”, “bond issue” and “deposits of 
government”. The 4 items on average covers 89.1% of total liabilities. The other 4 
liability items are “deposit of non-financial institutions”, “foreign liabilities”, “own 
capital”, and “other liabilities”. The reason why we left those 4 items is still due to 
lack of access to return data, and the 2 items “foreign liabilities”, “own capital” only 
occupy 1% of total liabilities.     27 
ASSETS max min mean LIABILITIES max min mean
Foreign Exchange 72.2% 35.4% 53.9% Currency issue 50.3% 16.7% 30.2%
Other Foreign Assets 7.7% 0.4% 2.0% Deposit of financial institutions 47.1% 29.3% 37.0%
Claims on Government 9.6% 1.9% 4.9% Deposits of non-financial institutions 15.6% 0.1% 6.0%
Claims on Depository Money Banks 42.8% 3.8% 15.5% Bond issue 27.8% 0.0% 14.4%
Claims on specific depository institutions 5.8% 0.9% 3.1% Deposits of government   14.8% 5.0% 10.2%
Claims on other financial institutions 23.1% 5.7% 14.1%
TOTAL ASSETS 100% 84% 92% TOTAL LIABILITIES 97% 75% 89%
Selected Proportional Balance sheet from Dec. 1999 to Dec.2008
 
Return on foreign exchange and other foreign assets 
We should be aware of the fact that the foreign exchange on PBoC’s balance sheet is 
recorded using the historical cost method. As a result, the value of foreign exchange 
will  not  change  with  the  exchange  rate.  Instead,  we  use  data  from  State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which is recorded with its fair value in 
USD, to estimate the return of foreign reserve. Both foreign exchange and other 
foreign assets are published by SAFE .   
The return rate of foreign exchange in China remains a mystery to the public. 
Neither of the return and component of foreign exchange is made publicly available 
by  the  Chinese  government  and,  hencewe  can  only  get  an  estimation  of  foreign 
exchange returns. Several assumptions apply: first, we assume that the structure of 
China’s foreign reserve is the same as IMF statistics, which mainly consists of three 
parts:  US  dollar  denominated  asset,  Euro  denominated  asset,  and  Japanese  Yen 
denominated  asset;  second,  we  adopted  10  year  government  bond  yield  of  each 
country to be the yield of each country’s currency denominated assets. Counting into 
the  effect  of  changing  exchange  rate  of  Euro/USD  and  JPY/USD,  the  weighted 
average return is the total foreign exchange return. 
Return on claim on government   
The item “claim on government” means that central banks directly purchased the 
national debt. Most of the time, central banks are prohibited from buying national 
debt  because it will increase money supply.  In China’s  case, this  only happened 
twice in history, which is the issue of 270 billion special national debt in 1998, and 
1350 billion in 2007. Both  issuances  are to  help state owned banks  out  of their   28 
enormous non-performing loans. Both  debts  have only one purchaser: PBC. The 
interest rates are 7.2%, and 4.3% respectively. Data from PBC’s balance sheet is in 
line with it. From December 1999 to July 2007, “claim on government” maintain a 
stable  level  of  under  300  billion  RMB.  In  August  2007,  this  data  changed 
dramatically  to  about  880  billion;  then  in  December  2007,  it  increased  to  1630 
billion, and never changed much hereafter.   
Based on the above information, we can easily identify the interest return of 
“claim on government”. Before July 2007, there is a constant return rate of 7.2%; 
then,  after  July  2007,  in  each  month’s  “claim  on  government”,  283  billion  is 
receiving 7.2% interest rate, and the remaining part receives 4.3% interest rate.   
Return of “claim on deposit money banks” & “Claims on specific depository 
institution” 
“Deposit  money  banks”  in  China  includes:  policy  banks,  joint  stock  banks, 
commercial banks, credit cooperatives, foreign banks, postal saving banks, finance 
companies. “Specific depository institutions” includes: National Development Bank, 
The Export-Import Bank of China, trust and investment companies, and financial 
leasing  companies.  “Claim  on  deposit  money  banks”  and  “claim  on  specific 
depository  institution”  mean  the  re-lending  from  central  bank  to  those  financial 
institutions.   
adjusting time one year six months three months 20 days average max min
1996.05.01 11.0 10.2 10.1 9.0 10.0 11.0 9.0
1996.08.23 10.6 10.2 9.7 9.0 9.8 10.6 9.0
1997.10.23 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.6 9.0 9.4 8.6
1998.03.21 7.9 7.0 6.8 6.4 7.2 7.9 6.4
1998.07.01 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.2 5.4 5.7 5.2
1998.12.07 5.1 5.0 4.9 4.6 4.9 5.1 4.6
1999.06.10 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.5 3.8 3.2
2002.02.21 3.2 3.2 3.0 2.7 3.0 3.2 2.7
2004.03.25 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.6 3.9 3.3
2008.01.01 4.7 4.6 4.4 4.1 4.4 4.7 4.1
2008.11.27 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.1
2008.12.23 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.8 3.1 3.3 2.8
Interest rate of loan from PBC to financial institutions
 
From PBoC, we can find interest rates of PBoC re-lending, which have 4 different   29 
types because of different time span. Since we can not know the exact structure of 
PBoC re-lending, we assume all loans have the same life span somewhere between 
three month and six months. So we take the average of the four interest rates. It is 
viable because each year, the 20 days interest rates are only 0.54% lower than one 
year interest rates. And since the life span and interest rate of all re-lending are the 
same, we can just multiply claim on both financial institutions to the average interest 
rate.   
Claims on other financial institution   
“Other financial institutions” means the financial institutions except deposit money 
banks,  specific  deposit  institutions,  and  the  central  bank.  It  mainly  includes 
insurance companies, security investment companies, fund management companies, 
pension funds, asset management companies, security companies, futures companies, 
stock exchange and future exchange, etc.   
For this item in PBoC balance sheet, it is mainly the loan that PBoC give to the 
Four asset management companies to purchase commercial banks’ non-performing 
loan. According to Huarong Asset Management Company’s website (Huarong is one 
of the Four asset management companies), the interest rate they pay to PBC on this 
loan  is  only  2.25%.  We  confirmed  that  all  the  loan  PBoC  gives  to  Four  asset 
management companies receive 2.25% interest rate.   
Currency issue   
This item will not cause any interest expenditures.   
Deposit of financial institutions   
This  item  “deposit  of  financial  institutions”  is  mainly  the  statutory  reserve  and 
excess reserve that financial institutions have been deposited in central bank. So their 
returns are the interest rates PBoC pay on statutory reserve and excess reserve, both 
of which are available on PBoC’s website. However, there is another problem that 
we don’t know how much proportion each kind occupies.   
Given legal reserve rate and RMB deposit, we can calculate the total statutory   30 
reserve money. Then use “deposit of financial institutions” minus the calculated total 
statutory reserve money, we can get excess reserve money.   
adjusting time legal reseve excess reserve adjusting time legal reseve excess reserve
1996.05.01 8.82 8.82 1999.06.10 2.07 2.07
1996.08.23 8.28 7.92 2002.02.21 1.89 1.89
1997.10.23 7.56 7.02 2003.12.21 1.62
1998.03.21 5.22 5.22 2005.03.17 0.99
1998.07.01 3.51 3.51 2008.11.27 1.62 0.72
1998.12.07 3.24 3.24
Interest rate of reserve
 
Using the interest rate on PBoC’s website and the estimated legal reserve/excess 
reserve ratio, we can get the return on “deposit of financial institutions”. 
Bond Issue 
From Wind data base, we downloaded the detailed information on the PBoC issued 
bond,  which  included  the  circulation,  issue  day,  due  day,  and  interest  rates.  We 
assume that if a bond is issued before the middle of a month or due after the end of 
this month, this bond is considered circulating on the market this month. Adding up 
all the circulating PBoC bonds and the total annual interest payment each month, we 
can get each month’s weighted average interest rate on PBoC bonds. 
Deposits of Government   
“Deposits  of  government”  are  the  fiscal  income  of  government  deposited  in  the 
central bank. Materials show that this deposit makes a current account interest rate. 